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Food shortages are historically associated with popular uprisings. Around 2008 there was a wave 
of protest and unrest in several low-and middle-income countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia 
and Latin America (Smith, 2014). These incidents were widely reported under the guise of food 
related protests and uprisings in the mass media. Scholarly interest in the relationship between 
food prices and political instability was rekindled (Van Weezel, 2016).  
This report reviews the literature on links between international food prices and political instability 
(including protests, riots and social unrest). The literature on food prices and protest, riots, unrest 
or violent incidents consists mainly of peer-reviewed scholarly articles that utilise econometric 
modelling. Some early studies examined the links between international food prices and political 
instability and found conflicting results. Some assessments concluded that there were links 
between international food prices or food insecurity and the number of violent incidents, while 
others found that such a link was tenuous. Subsequent work points out that international food 
prices do not always lead to increases in domestic food prices for a number of reasons (Van 
Weezel, 2016; Weinberg & Bakker, 2015). Scholars have moved away from using data on 
international food prices and tend to use data that is adjusted, to reflect the trends in domestic 
food prices or the variance between international and domestic food prices.  
Recent studies have argued that the relationship between food prices and protest or violent 
incidents is very complicated, and therefore it is difficult to find evidence to support a causal link 
(Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019; Raleigh et al., 2015). The main difficulty is the endogenous 
relationship between food prices and conflict, and in particular reverse causation. Conflict can 
affect food prices and food prices can exacerbate conflict. Recent studies utilise more 
sophisticated theoretical reasoning and estimation techniques to better understand the links 
between food prices and protest or violent incidents. However, the results from different studies 
are still contradictory. Hence, scholars call for better information and more studies of the link 
between food prices and protest, social unrest and other forms of conflict.  
This literature review covers some of the main arguments and findings in the recent literature on 
food prices and political instability or conflict. The majority of the econometric studies in this 
review find that there is a link between food price increases and a greater probability of protests, 
riots or social unrest. However, there are still a few studies that have contradictory results. So, 
the debate on the effect of food prices on political stability continues.  
There is evidence from quantitative studies and observation that conflict can affect the prices of 
or access to food: 
• Children in conflict zones have lower height for age and weight for age ratios while 
stunting and wasting is prevalent (Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019); 
• Food prices rose in Darfur after the onset of conflict (Arezki & Bruckner, 2011); 
• A study in Afghanistan found a negative association between conflict and food security; 
and (D’Souza & Jolliffe, 2013); and  
• Conflict can lead to a decline in agricultural production and hence the availability of food 
(Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011). 
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A number of quantitative studies find evidence that higher food prices lead to a greater 
probability of protests or social unrest (Arezki & Bruckner, 2011; Smith, 2014; Raleigh et al., 
2015; Bellemare, 2015; Weinberg & Bakker, 2015). More specifically:  
• Most of these studies account for domestic variations in food prices and study the 
relationship between conflict and food prices over an extended period of time; 
• There remains a small number of studies which find weak links between food prices and 
protests, riots or other forms of unrest (Hendrix et al., 2009; Buhaug et al., 2015;  Van 
Weezel, 2016); 
• A qualitative study on the motivations of protest in Bangladesh and India confirms the 
assertions made by some scholars that while food prices may trigger some form of unrest 
the underlying causes relate to long-standing economic or political grievances (Heslin, 
2020); 
• There is little mention of gender in the literature although there is a study which mentions 
that girls are more affected than boys when crop failure affects the availability of food. In 
addition, pregnant woman in conflict areas are more likely to give birth to underweight 
babies (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011; Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019); and  
• Disability was not discussed in the literature reviewed in this report.  
Food subsidies, cash transfers, price controls and the elimination of trade barriers are some of 
the policy interventions  that may address rising food prices and mitigate the rise of violent 
collective action (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011). However, the literature questions the effectiveness 
of such policies in cases where violence or protest action stems from deeper, underlying 
economic or political grievances (Smith, 2014; Weinberg & Bakker, 2015).  
 
2. Methodological issues relating to food prices and 
political instability 
Countries that are affected by food shortages tend to be prone to conflict, violence or instability. 
Nineteen countries that the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) classifies as being in a 
protracted food crisis are also affected by conflict and violence (Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). 
Thus, scholars have pondered about the relationship between the availability of food and 
probability of conflict, especially after 2008 when the media reported on many food related 
protests in low-and-middle-income countries (Van Weezel, 2016). Furthermore, Smith (2014, p. 
679) states that “Dramatic weather events, diversion of crops for fuel production, and continuing 
volatility in international grain markets have led many to postulate that urban food riots will 
become more frequent, pervasive and disruptive in the future.” 
There is a body of literature1 which argues that grievances (or relative deprivation) lead to 
incentives for conflict. Literature in this vein argues that rising food prices increase the propensity 
for protests and food riots. Young men in particular may join rebel groups to gain access to food 
 
1 See the work of Paul Collier and James Fearon.  
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(Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, Raleigh et al., 2015). However, finding the evidence to support these 
assertions is difficult because the relationship between food prices (as an indicator of the 
availability or accessibility of food) and conflict is both complex and influenced by many other 
factors (Smith 2014, van Weezel, 2016, Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). Therefore, it becomes 
difficult to find evidence of causal linkages between food prices and conflict. Moreover, the 
evidence may be contradictory. This section explores the methodological issues that make the 
interaction between food prices and political instability difficult to conceptualise and assess.  
 
Endogeneity challenges 
It is difficult to study the causal link between food prices and political instability because they are 
endogenous2 and there is limited evidence. According to Martin-Shields & Stojets (2018) there 
are two key sources of endogeneity, which are (1) unobserved confounding factors and (2) 
reverse causality. Confounding factors are strongly correlated with both food insecurity and 
conflict. For example, there is much evidence which suggests that national income is negatively 
correlated with violent conflict and positively correlated with food security. Likewise, state 
capacity is also related to violence and food security. Reverse causality occurs when it is difficult 
to ascertain the direction of the causal links: does food insecurity exacerbate conflict or does 
conflict contribute to food insecurity? (De Winne & Peersman, 2021; Raleigh et al., 2015). Some 
scholars have dealt with reverse causality by focusing their analysis on international food prices. 
They argue that international food prices are unlikely to be unaffected by local conflicts and as 
such there is less need for concern about endogeneity. However, it is still possible that global 
food prices can be confounded by variables such as global economic activity or oil prices (Smith, 
2014). Some quantitative studies address endogeneity by including fixed effects or instrumental 
variables in models, but De Winne and Peersman (2021) are not convinced that this approach 
eliminates endogeneity.  
 
International versus domestic food prices  
There is notable disparity between international and domestic food prices, even when countries 
are net importers of food (Hendrix et al., 2009; Weinberg & Bakker, 2014; Bellemare, 2014). 
Governments can take actions to mitigate the impact of international shocks on local food prices 
by using agricultural subsidies, export restrictions and price controls to stabilise markets (Smith, 
2014). Furthermore, local consumer food prices in individual countries do not always follow the 
trends in the FAO food price index. For example, in 2010 only Ivory Coast and Cameroon 
adhered to the trends in the FAO index. See figure 1. Hence, the connection between 
international and local food prices is not always straightforward. Smith (2014) and Weinberg & 
Bakker (2014) state that the assumption that changes in international commodity prices are 
directly related to domestic prices is flawed because there are a several other factors including 
domestic government policies which affect domestic prices of food. Moreover, country specific 
 
2 Variables are endogenous when they are closely related and it is not feasible to distinguish which variable is the 
cause and which one is the effect.  
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shocks relating to floods, drought or war cannot be modelled with international food price data 
(Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). 
 
See Figure 1: Domestic consumer food indices and the FAO Food Price Index, Source: Smith, 
2014, p. 681, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343314543722  
 
Definitions of conflict events 
A wide variety of conflict -type events are often referred to as food riots in media reports and the 
scholarly literature. As such, the findings of various studies may not be comparable (Smith, 2014; 
Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). Most of the studies that find a robust link between food prices 
and violent incidents refer to protests, riots, or social unrest.   
Food prices as a trigger of deeper grievances 
Food prices act as a stronger price signal to consumers than any other product (Weinberg & 
Bakker, 2014). “In general, food exhibits extremely low price and income elasticity of demand, 
owing to its necessity and the lack of any substitutable goods and the proportion of household 
income spent on food” (Weinberg & Bakker, 2014, p. 312). Consumers are forced to buy food 
regardless of price because they need to eat. Increases in food prices might be the trigger or 
catalyst for uprisings, but the root causes may be linked to long-standing economic or political 
grievances (Smith, 2014). For example, qualitative research undertaken by Heslin (2020) found 
that so-called food riots in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, were driven by long-standing 
grievances relating to low wages and the withholding of wages by employers in the textile sector.  
Moreover, as income decreases food accounts for a larger share of spending and therefore 
assumes more importance for an individual consumer. 
Data problems 
There is missing data on undernourishment for some countries, such as Libya, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria, which undermines country comparisons 
(Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). Mobile phone-based surveys can bridge some of these data 
gaps, as has been done in Afghanistan and Zimbabwe. There is consensus in the literature that 
better data is needed. Hendrix et al. (2009) call for better information on country specific shocks 
which may or may not be correlated with international shocks.  
 
3. The effect of violent conflict on food security 
Due to the endogenous relationship between food security and violent conflict there are a 
number of pathways through which conflict can contribute to a decline in food security (Brück et 
al., 2019; Gates et al., 2016). It is beyond the scope of this literature review to provide a detailed 
overview of the impact of conflict on food security. However, some linkages are discussed to 
highlight the endogenous relationship between food prices and protests, riots and social unrest.   
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The impact of violent conflict on nutritional status 
Exposure to conflict has adverse effects on the nutritional status of children. An analysis of height 
for age Z score (HAZ) and weight for age Z score (WAZ) data from Burundi shows that children 
in the 0-5 age group who were born in regions affected by civil war or violence have significantly 
lower HAZ scores than those born in other regions (Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). Similar 
findings have been observed in Angola, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq and 
Mexico. The civil war in Rwanda contributed notably to stunting among children. The effect is 
stronger among girls who are negatively affected when crop failure occurs. Moreover, the 
negative effects of conflict on nutrition among children may commence before the child is born (in 
utero). Evidence suggests that women who are exposed to conflict during pregnancy are more 
likely to give birth to children who are underweight. These findings have been observed in 
Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Nepal, Kashmir and Palestine. There is a need for more robust 
evidence as well as evidence which focuses on acute malnutrition which may occur during a 
period of conflict (Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). 
The effect of violent conflict on consumption of food 
Displacement due to conflict undermines productivity and food consumption. Groups may 
compete with the local population for access to food. Food and hunger can be used as weapons 
of war. There are very few studies on the direct and indirect impact of conflict on consumption 
(Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). Civil war can lead to an increase in domestic food prices. For 
example, in Darfur prices of the main staple foods increased rapidly after the onset of 
widespread violence in late 2003/early 2004 (Areski & Bruckner, 2011). Furthermore, low-income 
countries are especially vulnerable to food price increases or shocks because they have limited 
foreign-exchange reserves and less capacity to borrow (Hendrix et al., 2009). 
Case Study: Afghanistan  
Food insecurity is a serious problem in Afghanistan where nearly 30% of the population do not 
obtain minimum daily food requirements (2,100 kcal per person) (D’Souza & Jolliffe, 2013). 
Furthermore 60% of children under five experience chronic malnutrition including stunting while 
8% suffer from acute malnutrition and wasting. A quantitative study using regression analysis 
was conducted to determine if conflict and food insecurity were related in Afghanistan. This study 
made use of survey data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 
2007/2008 and data on violent incidents compiled by the United Nations Department of Safety 
and Security. The main finding of the study is that there was a strong negative relationship 
between conflict and food security, suggesting that extended conflict can disrupt markets and 
influence the extent to which households are able to access food. The sharp rise in wheat prices 
in 2008 contributed to a drastic decline in purchasing power for Afghan households and 
subsequent deterioration of well-being (D’Souza & Jolliffe, 2013). 
The effect of violent conflict on agricultural production 
There are many studies which investigate the effect of civil war on economic production and 
growth in a number of countries. The evidence suggests that agricultural production declines due 
to dwindling labour supply, access to land, access to credit, theft and destruction that occurs 
during violent conflict (Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). Even countries which are net exporters of 
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food may be at risk because rising food prices may encourage producers to shift output to export 
markets at the expense of the local market (Hendrix et al., 2009). 
Agricultural production has a complex relationship with conflict. There are instances where rebel 
groups rely on the revenue from agricultural production and therefore increases in food prices 
can raise the incidence of small-scale conflict. For example, data from the Philippines show that 
increases in the price of major export crops can lead to an intensification of violence. Likewise, 
rebels in Colombia alter their tactics in line with trends in the price for coffee and cocoa (Martin-
Shields & Stojets, 2018). 
 
4. The effect of food prices/security on violent conflict or 
protests/riots/unrest 
Food insecurity may create incentives for people to engage in violent behaviour. However, such 
motives are complex and very difficult to isolate from other factors which may be indirectly 
related to food insecurity such as ideology (Martin-Shields & Stojets, 2018). There is qualitative 
data which documents how civilians seek support from armed groups to protect their livelihoods 
and food security. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) provide evidence that indicates that armed 
groups target recruits by providing food,  shelter and physical security. However, it is very difficult 
to test the links in this causal chain. According to Brinkman & Hendrix (2011) causal arguments 
that link food insecurity to political violence fail to explain how food insecurity affects the decision 
to participate in violence on the part of individuals.  
Studies on the impact of food prices on protest, riots or unrest 
It is generally argued that rises in international food prices create consumer grievances that lead 
to conflict, usually in the form of protest, riots, violence and war. Hendrix, Haggard and Magaloni 
(2009) state that there has been rapid inflation in global food prices since 2000. Moreover, 
between 1961 to 20063 many countries moved from being net exporters of food to becoming net 
importers of food. Global food price shocks in 2007 and 2008 are widely believed to have 
contributed to food riots in the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Morocco), sub Saharan 
Africa (Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mozambique, Mauritania, Cameroon and Guinea), Asia 
(Bangladesh, India, Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand and North Korea) and Latin America 
(Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Mexico).  
 
3 In 1960 developing countries had an overall agricultural trade surplus of almost USD7 billion per year. By 2000 
the surplus had changed to a deficit of more than USD11 billion according to the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women in 2008 (Hendrix et al., 2009). This transformation is attributed to development policies which 
favoured industrialisation over agriculture, urbanisation and rising incomes in developing countries. In addition, 
trade liberalisation policies also undermined small-scale agricultural producers in developing countries (Hendrix 
et al., 2009). Over time, fragile states have experienced higher dependency on food imports compared with other 
developing countries (Brinkman & Hendrix (2011). 
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In poor countries food is the primary expense4 and a rise in food prices is anticipated to have a 
detrimental impact on households (Bora et al., 2011). However rising food prices may have an 
uneven impact as they may “hurt urban consumers but help rural producers” (Hendrix et al., 
2009, p. 10). It is therefore possible that consumers will protest when prices rise but that 
producers may protest when prices are falling. Martin-Shields & Stojets (2018) provide an 
overview of the studies on food prices and conflict which finds contradictory results. They note 
studies that use data relating to food prices that are orientated towards production or export 
shares tend to find that higher food prices lead to less unrest although there are exceptions. In 
contrast, studies that use food prices that are orientated towards imports or consumption share 
usually find that higher prices lead to more unrest. Furthermore, it must also be considered that 
incomes tend to be higher in urban areas whereas absolute poverty tends to be widespread in 
rural areas, and these factors may influence where and when protests arise (Martin-Shields & 
Stojets, 2018). 
Hendrix et al. (2009) argue that protest is more likely to occur in hybrid regimes than in either 
democracies or autocracies. In democracies there are other outlets such as elections for citizens 
to voice their dissatisfaction with government. Hybrid regimes are likely to tolerate protests if they 
believe they can prevent them from becoming revolutionary movements that threaten their 
authority. Such governments are willing to make concessions as long as the demands are 
restricted to bread-and-butter issues that do not challenge the incumbent rule, for example tariffs, 
subsidies, wages and food. Hybrid regimes differ from hard autocratic regimes that do not leave 
any options for protest, and where any kind of anti-government mobilisation will be harshly 
repressed. Hybrid regimes may also use controlled protest  as a tool of monitoring the state itself 
and collecting information. Hendrix et al. (2009) conducted a quantitative analysis of 55 major 
cities in 49 countries located in Asia or Africa during the period 1961 to 2006. They find that 
regime type is a significant determinant of protest. The relationship is not linear and protest is 
more concentrated in hybrid regimes than in democracies (Hendrix et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
using econometric modelling Hendrix et al. (2009) test the relationship between the world wheat 
price and the incidence of protest across different regime types. The following findings were 
observed in the study: 
• There is no consistent relationship between the level of economic development and 
protest. Likewise there is no relationship between the level of the world wheat price and 
incidence of protest; 
• GDP growth is strongly and negatively associated with the incidence of protests and 
riots; 
• There is a curvilinear relationship between the wheat price change and protest in riots; 
• There is a strong, positive relationship between democracy and protest;  
• Hybrid regimes are sensitive to the level of wheat price. Higher prices are associated with 
more protest in hybrid regimes; and 
 
4 The FAO estimates that households in fragile states spend on average 57.5% of their spending on food and as 
such they are very vulnerable to rises in food prices (Brinkman & Hendrix (2011). 
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• There is some support for the modernisation hypothesis in hybrid regimes. There is a 
significant positive and curvilinear relationship between GDP per capita and protest 
among hybrid regimes.  
 
Van Weezel (2016) created a country specific food price index that that weights the international 
food prices by the import level of the country. Civil unrest is measured by the number of violent 
events that happen in a month. It is expected that by focusing on African countries which are net 
importers of food, endogeneity may be less of a problem. Regression analysis was conducted for 
45 countries from 1990 to 2011. The findings were as follows: 
• Food prices (especially for wheat) are related to the probability of violent events but 
regime type was a stronger predictor of such violence than food prices; 
• The magnitude of the food price effect is relatively modest; and  
• Overall, the study does not find robust evidence that there is a link between food 
prices and civil unrest.  
Smith (2014) conducted regression analysis with instrumental variables to test the relationship 
between domestic food price changes and the incidence of violence in several African countries. 
The dependent variable, urban socio-political unrest was based on the Social Conflict in Africa 
Database, which includes data on over 10,300 demonstrations, protests, strikes, riots and other 
communal conflicts in 48 African countries from 1990 to 2012. The results of the study provide 
robust evidence that there is a causal relationship between changes in domestic food prices and 
the probability of unrest. Furthermore, unrest is more likely to occur when there are larger food 
price spikes. The findings have an important policy implication because price stability in local 
markets may be used to maintain political and social stability. However, food price stability may 
not be sufficient to quell unrest in cases where more fundamental economic or political 
grievances are the underlying causes of the violent incidents (Smith, 2014). 
Weinberg &  Bakker (2014) examined the link between food prices and social unrest by focusing 
on factors that influence domestic food prices. They utilised the World Bank Consumer Tax 
Equivalent (CTE) index. The CTE is an assessment of the difference between international and 
domestic prices, and it is expressed as a percentage of the international price. It is able to 
capture the extent to which national policies relating to agriculture or trade influence domestic 
prices. The study measures social unrest as a count of the total instances of unrest in each 
country by year. This measure is based on 71 countries and 3,288 social unrest events from 
1972 to 2007. The model was estimated using mixed effects panel Poisson regression. The 
results reveal that instances of social unrest were more frequent in years in which food prices 
had increased. Furthermore, larger food price increases resulted in higher counts of social 
unrest. Governments that were able to keep prices stable regardless of fluctuations in the market 
were able to safeguard against a higher risk of social unrest breaking out. The overall conclusion 
is that keeping all other variables constant, changes in food prices have a meaningful impact on 
the prevalence of social unrest. 
Qualitative research undertaken by Heslin (2020) on so-called food riots in Dhaka, Bangladesh 
and West Bengal, India found that the protests were motivated by deeper grievances. Heslin 
(2020, p. 211) notes “The lack of access to food could serve as an entry point to make demands 
against political corruption and labour rights violations. In this way, the protesters are not 
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necessarily demanding lower prices but utilising the symbolic power of the commodification of a 
public good to mobilise resources against powerholders. Food has such symbolic power to 
mobilise populations against powerholders where its commodification is not fully accepted.” 
Buhaug et al. (2015) undertook an ambitious quantitative analysis which tries to link climate 
events with food output and political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. They use estimates of food 
production from the United Nations FAO databank, various sources of data on conflict including 
the Social Conflict in Africa Database and rainfall variations. The models did not ascertain any 
links between food production and conflict. There were no significant links between climate 
variability and political violence using food production as an intermediary variable. However, 
Buhaug et al. (2015) point out that despite these findings it is unwise to dismiss possible links 
between food security and social unrest.  
Bellemare (2014) studied the relationship between food prices and riots using monthly food price 
data, which he suggests is an improvement over earlier studies that used annual data since 
monthly data captures short-term price fluctuations. Furthermore, this study looks at the impact 
of food price volatility on violence as well. The study used the FAO’s food price index, which is a 
monthly indicator of the price of food across the world for five food groups (meat, dairy, cereals, 
oil and fats and sugar). Violent events were counted using media reports and terms such as 
“demonstration, mob, protest, riot, strike, unrest or violence”. The study found that rising food 
prices appear to cause social unrest. Food price volatility was negatively associated to social 
unrest. There is also some evidence that food price volatility could decrease the number of food 
riots observed between 2010 and 2011. 
Arezki & Bruckner (2011) studied the impact of international food price variations on political and 
social stability. They found that international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of 
democratic institutions in low-income countries. In contrast in high income countries increases in 
international food prices did not have a significant effect on internal stability. They also state that 
higher food prices significantly increase the probability of civil conflict in the country. 
De Winne and Peersman (2021) undertook an analysis of food prices and conflict by attempting 
to avoid the endogeneity problems that affect the linkage by isolating strictly exogenous changes 
in international food prices. An instrumental variable which comprises the quarterly series of 
unexpected harvest shocks outside the African continent was created. The aim was to identify 
unexpected variations in harvests that were of sufficient magnitude to affect the global supply of 
food and shift international food prices. The instrument was derived by constructing a quarterly 
index of global food production for four crop types: wheat, maize, rice and soybeans. Annual 
harvest data from the FAO was used to estimate unexpected changes in global food production 
which also takes account of the time lapse between a poor harvest and its impact on prices. Data 
from harvests in Africa were excluded to avoid endogeneity issues. Another measure of food 
supply was created using data from newspaper articles and FAO reports as well as information 
from natural disaster databases. Data on conflict was obtained from databases compiled by 
various NGOs as well as the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme. The results of the regression 
models found that food price increases have a positive impact on conflict. However, the impact of 
rising food prices on conflict is relatively modest in the first year after the price shock, but will 
intensify approximately one year later. The impact of food prices tends to peak around six 
quarters after the price increase and dissipates after approximately two years. A 1% rise in food 
prices leads to an increase of 0.03 percentage points for conflict after six quarters. It is estimated 
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that a 10% increase in exogenous food prices leads to an increase in factor conflict probability of 
52%. Furthermore, exogenous food price increases have a stronger effect for conflict types such 
as riots and protest than battles over land control. The effect is likely to manifest one year after 
the price increase. 
Raleigh et al. (2015) conducted regression analysis to test the links between climate, food prices 
and conflict in Africa. They contend that in Africa food prices for basic commodities are largely 
locally determined. This view departs from other studies on Africa which assert that most 
countries are net importers of food and therefore assume that international food prices have an 
influence on domestic food prices. Conflict is assessed in terms of the number of violent conflicts 
that occurred in a given month from 1997 to 2010. Food prices are measured by the commodity 
price per kilogram for specific markets and months. The data come from USAID FEWS- Net and 
other reports of commodity prices in Africa. The climate is incorporated into the analysis through 
rainfall measures. It is argued that agriculture in Africa is mostly rain fed and therefore it is 
anticipated that rainfall has a notable impact on food production and output. The findings of this 
study are as follows: 
• Higher rates of conflict were found in areas with higher food prices; 
• Violence raises the average prices of commodities and markets; 
• Dry weather conditions were associated with higher levels of conflict and hence 
decreased rainfall appears to have an indirect effect on conflict through its impact on 
commodity prices. 
•  
Mitigating the impact on food prices on conflict  
The literature mentions the following policies and interventions which can be used to alleviate the 
impact of rising food prices and thus mitigate the likelihood that protest or social unrest will arise.  
• Food price subsidies can be used to ensure that the real price of food is stable. 
Bellemare (2014) cautions that it may be ill-advised to curb food price subsidies 
especially in urban areas where food riots are most likely to erupt. If austerity policies 
necessitate a decline in subsidies for food then this should be done gradually; 
• Trade barriers can be removed to increase the supply and lower the price of food 
(Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011). 
• Price controls can be used to stabilise the cost of food (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011); 
• Government-controlled reserves of food can be utilised to stabilise prices (Brinkman & 
Hendrix, 2011). This type of system has been effectively used in Indonesia. An excellent 
market and production information system is necessary to effectively manage food 
reserves; and 
• Social protection policies can be used as a buffer against rising food prices (Brinkman 
and Hendrix, 2011). This includes cash or food for work programmes, cash transfers and 
provision of meals at schools. 
Raleigh et al. (2015) contend that in rural areas intervention may be necessary to mitigate the 
detrimental impact of climate conditions, which may undermine food production and heighten the 
possibility that violence will follow.   
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There is consensus in the literature that if rising food prices are the trigger of protest or social 
unrest rather than the underlying cause, then it is possible that policies which aim to stabilise 
food prices may not be sufficient for curbing violence (Smith, 2014; Weinberg & Bakker, 2014, 
Heslin, 2021). 
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